4.3

'STATE VERSUS ISLAM: MALAY FAMILIES, WOMEN'S BODIES AND THE BODY POLITIC IN MALAYSIA'

Aihwa Ong

In the summer of 1990, on my annual visit to Malaysia, I noticed that many young Malay women had traded in their black Islamic robes (*hijab*) for pastel colored ones, and that their headcloths (*mini-telekung*) were now embroidered with flowers. The effect was rather like seeing a black and white film in color. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Malaysian campuses were the hotbeds of Islamic resurgence, female students shrouded in black robes and veils sometimes appeared like phalanxes of Allah's soldiers. Now university women were dressed in *hijab* outfits that had been transformed by color and more subtle touches in cut, style and decoration. As they walked around campus, many attracted the eyes of young men, who were sometimes rewarded with subdued giggles and responsive glances. The Islamic resurgence of the 1970s, emerging in its black female garb and fiery criticism of Western consumerism, official corruption and the spiritual hollowness of modern life, had settled down as a normalized cultural practice in which people carried on the daily affairs of life of an affluent, developing country.

Competing images of the Malay woman and family are key elements in the social construction of modern Malaysian society. This chapter discusses the social effects of state policies and Islamic resurgence from the 1980s to the early 1990s, as they both negotiated different models of Malay womanhood and kinship. By seeking out the contrasting logic and tropes of official and resurgent discourses, my interpretation differs from other studies of the secular Malaysian state and the Islamic resurgence. Scholars have examined the impact of state intervention on Malay class differentiation (Jomo 1988; Scott 1985; Shamsul 1986; Wong 1988) while viewing the Islamic resurgence as an anti-government strategy among the politically marginalized (Kessler 1978, 1980; Nagata 1984; Chandra 1986; Hassan 1987). These works on state-peasant relations have focused on the structural reorganization of Malaysian society but have quite misplaced the class emphasis of the Islamic resurgence, and the critical role of gender renegotiation in modern Malay life.

Challenging these views, I argue that the state project and the Islamic resurgence must be seen as competing forms of postcolonial nationalism that fix upon the Malay family and woman as icons of particular forms of modernity. Writing about 'imagined communities', Benedict Anderson (1992) focused on the rise of 'official nationalisms' led by traditional elites in their struggles against colonial rulers, but he quite neglected the importance of what Partha Chatterjee calls the

'narrative of community' that is not domesticated to the requirements of the postcolonial state (1993: pp. 238–39). In Malaysia, state-sponsored development expressed a particular vision of modernity that incited an Islam-inspired backlash among the emergent Malay middle classes attempting to secure their interests against state encroachments that challenge male authority. These tensions in the state-Islamic struggle are frequently ignored by scholars accustomed to interpreting Malaysian political culture in terms of peasant politics and electoral struggles (a major exception is Kessler 1978). For instance, *Fragmented Vision* (Kahn and Loh 1993), a volume that claims to explore different visions of postcolonial Malaysian society, remains heavily focused on intra- and interethnic rivalries while giving short shrift to gender relations in the re-envisioning of modern Malaysia. Such a male bias reproduces an orientalist view whereby Asian women, fetishized as sexual objects (mothers, wives, prostitutes) and cheap docile workers, are disregarded as political subjects and icons in the struggle to redefine communal identity (Ong 1993).

Indeed, the political culture of postcolonial societies is often forged in ideological struggles over the concepts of family, gender and race. For instance, in implementing secular, technocratic development projects, modern states routinely zero in on the domestic unit as the object of social policy. In countries as different as early-twentieth-century France (Donzelot 1979), contemporary Singapore (Salaff 1988), and socialist China (Anagnost 1989), the family has been variously defined, manipulated and generally subjected to the regulation of health, educational, and welfare programs. Such disciplinary interventions are an aspect of what Michel Foucault calls 'bio-power', or the state management of the population to secure its control, welfare and productivity (1978: pp. 141–7). Modern state power is not imposed so much as absorbed into society through the 'capillary' actions of the human sciences and social techniques that penetrate the nooks and crannies of everyday life. In Malaysia, the New Economic Policy (introduced in 1972) represented not only the economic modernization of Malay society, but also a social intervention into its very constitution and understanding of itself. Official policies were introduced to reshape domestic relations, to mark off the domestic from the public and to sponsor the large-scale entry of young women into mass education and industry.

What have been the cultural effects of this state reconstitution of the Malay peasantry? James Scott (1985), insisting upon an indefensible demarcation between state hegemony and Malay peasant culture, maintains that 'everyday forms of resistance' are an index of peasants' agency protesting economic change in the countryside. While Scott's general observations about peasant resentment may have captured the contrary impulses of village Malaysia, his model of individualistic expressions of free will unmediated by larger solidarities as Muslims and as Malays in Malaysia is highly problematic.[1] As Foucault has pointed out, subjects are materially constituted by power relations and are always part of them. Malay peasants' increasingly dense ties to government programs, party politics and patronage networks cannot be discounted in our understanding of their agency. Thus the question of agency, as reformulated by Marilyn Strathern, goes beyond the independent action of individuals and must focus on the interests 'in terms of which they act'; their aims are 'not necessarily … independently conceived' (1987: p. 22). Her perspective refines and moves beyond the 'active/passive' model often used in discussions of women's agency. Although I will sometimes talk about the independent actions of individual women and men, in this essay I generally conceive of social agency in terms of 'how social effects are registered' (Strathern 1987: p. 23) in shifting fields of power. For instance, regardless of the motivations and experiences of individuals, tensions between state policies and the Islamic resurgence have incited and intensified concerns about female sex, spaces and actions, and these tensions have gone into shaping the changing social order. Knowledge-power schemes imposed by the state, and the counterdisciplinary actions proposed by Islamic revivalists, have affected women in different classes in different ways. In Malaysia, there are different Islamic resurgent groups (Nagata 1984), and an Islamic party PAS (Patai Islam Se-Malaysia) enjoys broad peasant support in the rural state of Kelantan (Kessler 1978, 1980). However, the widespread popularity of ABIM (Islamic Youth Movement of

Malaysia) among the emergent Malay middle class raises the question as to why university-educated men and women in the 1980s came to identify, in their words and bodily presentation, with the ethos of a resurgent, patriarchal form of Islam.

I will begin by briefly discussing the official racial construction of Malayness and the ways in which Islam and local customs concerning community, kinship and gender have shaped an understanding of Malayness in village society. Next, I discuss the state's interventions in Malay peasant society, especially through its family planning policies, its promotion of female out-migration and industrial employment, and its ideology of rural women's duties in 'poverty eradication' campaigns. These changes in Malay society, both in villages and among migrants in the cities, contributed to the rise of a strict form of Islamic culture among young men and women who had benefited directly from government efforts to create a Malay petty bourgeoisie overnight. The next section discusses the ways in which competing state and Islamic resurgent discourses use women as symbols of motherhood, Malay vulnerability, and as boundary markers in their visions of Malaysian modernity. I end by considering the apparently paradoxical problem of educated middle-class women who express their agency by aligning themselves with the patriarchal forces of an alternative Islamic imaginary.

KINSHIP, GENDER AND COMMUNITY IN MALAY PEASANT SOCIETY

Before British intervention in the late nineteenth century, Malays were defined not by race but by their allegiance to sultans in the Malay Peninsula (Milner 1982). Colonial administrators were the first to legally differentiate the sultans' subjects from non-Malay immigrants in racial terms: a Malay was 'a person belonging to any Malay race who habitually speaks the Malay language … and professes the Muslim religion.'[2] This racial and behavioral definition was broad enough to embrace immigrants from the Malay archipelago, who could settle in the Peninsula and receive land grants denied to non-Malays. Thus, 'Malays' in contemporary Malaysia, the majority of whom live in the *kampung* (villages), include groups like the Javanese, Bugis, Acehnese and Minangkabau. Collectively racialized by the colonial state as 'Malays', they were categorically opposed to Chinese, Indians and other immigrants to colonial Malaya.

After independence (1957), the UMNO (United Malay National Organization) inherited the practice of defining citizens in racial terms (*bangsa*), distinguishing between Malays, who are all Muslim,[3] and the predominantly non-Muslim Chinese and Indians.[4] Statistics measuring the relative size of the three 'races' and providing evidence of their relative poverty and wealth have been a critical part of modern Malaysian politics and racial consciousness. In 1969, racial riots protesting the poverty of Malays, the majority of whom were peasants, forced a rapid adjustment between the state and the races. The UMNO government introduced a New Economic Policy (NEP) designed to 'eradicate poverty' and to bring an end to the ethnic identification with economic roles. This policy was to have profound social implications for village Malay culture and domestic politics.

Local conditions and the historical interactions of custom (*adat*) with Islam have shaped Malay beliefs and practices concerning kinship, residence and property. Although men traditionally enjoyed prerogatives in religion and property, women were neither confined to the household nor totally dependent on men for economic survival. Malay society is often cited as an example of a Muslim society that permitted relatively egalitarian relations between the sexes (Djamour 1959; Firth 1966; Swift 1963; Karim 1992), compared, say, with the rigid gender segregation found in Bangladesh (Kabeer 1988). However, throughout the twentieth century, and more recently under the NEP, forces linked to economic development and the Islamic resurgence have undermined the *adat* emphasis on bilaterality while strengthening Islamic tenets that increase male control in the emerging Malay middle class.

In 1979 and 1980, I conducted fieldwork in Sungai Jawa (a pseudonym), a village in Kuala Langat, in the state of Selangor. Among the villagers, the sexual division of labor and emphasis on bilateral kinship somewhat attenuated the patrilateral bias of Islamic law. Both men and women tapped rubber and tended coffee trees in their holdings. Until the early 1970s, only *kampung* men sought migrant work; a few women, usually divorcées or widows, were compelled to earn wages outside the village as rubber tappers or domestic servants. In recent years, however, population growth and land scarcity have affected gender relations and peasant householding. The *adat* practice of awarding equal land shares to sons and daughters has been superseded by the Islamic Shafi'i law dictating that sons be entitled to claim shares twice those of their sisters. Female-owned plots too small to be farmed separately are now often bought up by brothers. This emphasis on male inheritance has led to a situation in which most farms are the husband's property. In the sections that follow, I will discuss domestic relations in Sungai Jawa in order to show how concepts of kinship, gender and reproduction have been transformed by state policies and Islamic revivalism.

Malays throughout the Peninsula (excluding the matrilineally-oriented Minangkabau), it has been shown, prefer nuclear households to more complex domestic arrangements (Firth 1966; Laderman 1983). In Sungai Jawa, 80 percent of the 242 households I surveyed were nuclear units. Despite important day-to-day relations between kin and neighbor, the founding of a *rumah tangga* – a 'house served by a single staircase' – was considered essential to male adulthood. A married man compelled to reside with his parents would consider his status diminished. An informant noted that Malays would find intolerable the extended households of rural Chinese, in which different generations pool resources and even set up father-son businesses. It was a question of autonomy (he used the English word 'independence') and control by the adult male. *Adat* required the father to give his son the property in order to establish a new household upon marriage. Once the head of his own household, a man was free from parental claims on his labor and earnings. A married man working on his father's land would expect to be paid like any other hired help.

Second, independent householding by a man made clear his sexual rights in his wife and authority over his daughters and sons. This fact was brought home to me when I first sought residence in Sungai Jawa. Since I am a Chinese woman, villagers advised me against setting up a separate household. Elsewhere, single female nurses and teachers who wished to live in villages stayed in government quarters, their status and reputation protected. As a researcher, however, I did not have such a clearly specified role or this sort of official supervision. If I were to rent a house on my own, I would be perceived as a woman eminently seduceable by village men. I was kindly invited to lodge with a household, on the condition that I take the role of an adopted daughter, thus dispelling suspicions that I might be a mistress to men in the family. In fact, the Malay expression for living together (*bersama*) implies having a sexual relationship, much as the American expression does.

Strathern points out that gender ideas often operate as an indigenous conceptualization of social cause and effect (1987: p. 24). In the Malay village, gender differentiation was commonly expressed not in terms of biological makeup but in terms of morality. A basic aspect of a man's role was guardianship – of his sisters', wife's and daughters' virtue. By extension, all village men were responsible for the moral status of all village women. This code of morality was often explained in terms of men's greater rationality and self-control (*akal*) and women' s greater susceptibility to animalistic lust (*nafsu*). This notion of moral capacity was also reflected in the concept of procreation, in which the male seed was considered 'the active principle' nourished by the womb (Banks 1983: pp. 67–8). In accordance with Islamic tradition, Malays considered the children of one man mothered by different women (all bear his name) to be more closely related than the children of one woman fathered by different men. The former relationship was one of clearly defined paternity (*keturunan*), whereas the latter was considered the product of *saudara anjing* or 'dog relations' (Banks 1983: p. 68). (Malays find dogs especially loathsome [*menghina*], and the phrase connotes indiscriminate and impure sexuality on the

part of the woman.) However, in practice, *adat* often prevailed over the Islamic law on paternity, by stressing a woman's rights in her children. Thus, children by different fathers were also called 'milk siblings' (*adik beradik susu*). In divorce cases, judges often gave women custody of the children, favoring the *adat* emphasis on maternity ('shared breast'). This custom reflected the belief that children, if they so chose, should remain with their mothers. Nevertheless, a man could contest such a settlement by appealing to the Islamic court, and he could even claim as his own all children conceived during the period in which he had provided his wife support. In return for his provision of food, shelter and clothing, a woman provided for her husband's everyday needs. A man could divorce his wife by simply repudiating (*talak*) her three times, whereas she needed judicial intervention to divorce her husband, on the grounds of his failure to provide support or to consummate the marriage.

Masculinity thus depended to an important degree, though not entirely, on a man's economic power and moral authority over women in his household. The Islamic emphasis on female chastity imposed more rigorous restrictions on unmarried women (called *anak data* or virgins) than on unmarried youths, although promiscuity in either sex was criticized. Young girls were required to be bashful and modest, but the Islamic emphasis on *aurat* ('nakedness' that should be covered) did not, until recently, extend to covering girls' hair (an erotic feature), which they wore loose or plaited. Everyday dress consisted of loose-fitting long tunics over sarongs (*baju kurong*). Before the recent wave of out-migration for wage work and higher education, adolescent daughters were expected to stay close to home and to keep a circumspect distance from male kinsmen. An important role of young men was to prevent their sisters from interacting with men, a practice that compromised their virtue.

Adat defined adult womanhood in other ways, but always within the Islamic construction of womens' relation to men. In everyday life, married women could move freely in tending to their cash-crop gardens or engaging in petty trade. They were not, however, supposed to sit in coffee shops or to seek male company. Women were the ones who maintained kin and neighborly relations by sharing resources, information, childcare and the work of preparing feasts. *Keluarga*, the word often rendered as 'family' in English, were open-ended kindred circles maintained by female kin between village households. In their own homes, married women customarily held the purse strings, despite the Islamic emphasis on men's keeping and handling money. Most important, women's special knowledge and skills were used in cooking, childbirth, health care (Laderman 1983) and the intensification of sexual pleasure (Karim 1992).[5] Women's *adat* knowledge included the art of preserving their sexual attractiveness to retain their husbands' interest. Married women wore their hair in buns, but on special occasions they dressed up in close-fitting, semitransparent jackets (*kebaya*) and batik sarongs. A lacy shawl (*selendang*) draped loosely over the head and shoulders could be used as a sunscreen and, occasionally, as a means of flirtation. Emphasizing their sexual charms, married women's clothing was in sharp contrast to the modest attire required of unmarried girls. Because sexually experienced and not legally subordinated to any man, previously married women, whether widows or divorcées (called by the same term, *janda*), were considered both vulnerable and dangerous. *Janda* were frequently suspected of trying to steal husbands. The virginity code and sanctions against adultery permitted sex only between spouses.[6] This did not prevent premarital or extramarital sex, but the Islamic ban on *khalwat* (illicit proximity) made having affairs a risky business.

Just as self-control and control of his wife's sexuality defined a man's adult status, regulating the activities of unmarried women – virgins and *janda* – defined the collective identity of *kampung* men. In Sungai Jawa, young men, with the implicit backing of Islamic elders, kept a watch on couples carrying on illicit affairs. If 'caught wet' (*tangkap basah*) and found to be unmarried, a couple would be compelled to marry as soon as possible. If either party were already married, the man would be beaten as a warning to other would-be adulterers. Sometimes the Islamic court would impose fines or even imprisonment, but villagers preferred to police and punish sexual misconduct themselves, as part of

their role in safeguarding morality and protecting the boundaries between Malays and non-Malays (Ong 1990). Thus, youths would be more ferocious in their attacks if the paramour were an outsider or a non-Malay man. For instance, a Chinese man who dated a Malay factory girl was attacked and, according to one of my informants, left half-dead; he was in a coma for three days'. Male protection of female sexuality delineated the boundaries between male and female spaces (cf. Mernissi 1987: pp. xv-xvii), as well as between Muslims and the wider, multiethnic society.

In *kampung* society, then, Islamic law defined a man's identity in terms of his ability to prepare his sons for independent householding, to control the sexuality of his wife and daughters, and to provide all economic support for his household. However, *adat* practices and kindred relations provided women a measure of autonomy and influence in everyday life that prevented a rigid observation of male authority. In recent years, state policies and capitalist relations have created conditions that make the regulation of female sexuality a major issue. The possibilities for interracial liaisons created by the interweaving of Malay and non-Malay worlds have been perceived as a threat to Malay male rights and as a dangerous blurring of boundaries between Muslim and non-Muslim groups. As we shall see, control over female sexuality has been made a focus of the resulting efforts to strengthen male authority, reinforce group boundaries and ensure the cultural survival of the Malay community undergoing 'modernization'.

STATE INTERVENTION: MAKING THE MODERN MALAY FAMILY

Under British rule, numerous laws like land tenure enactments presaged the dramatic postcolonial 'social engineering' of Malay society brought about by the NEP. Under this program, Malays were now legally defined as *bumiputera* or 'sons of the soil'.[7] The most important goal of this indigenization program was to correct interethnic economic imbalances by bringing thirty percent of the nation's wealth under *bumiputera* control by 1990.[8] The new state ideology, *Rukunegara*, produced a view of Malaysian modernity in which Malays were to become capitalists, professionals and workers, a dominant part of the citizenry who, because of their certified status as original natives, had special claims to national wealth. An expansion of state policies to remake the peasantry along these lines gradually increased class differentiation in Malay village society and stimulated the urban migration of young women and men. Such changes in the political economy class and ethnic formations, including state policies affecting the Malay family, contributed to the growing crisis of the Malay peasantry, which became inseparable from a crisis in Malay cultural identity. *Kampung* notions of kinship, conjugal rights, and gender were increasingly subjected to the operation of state policies.

Capitalist Development and Out-migration

Among the complex effects of the NEP was an improvement in living conditions in the *kampung* coupled with a reduction in the ability of most peasants to support their children by farming. For instance, double-cropping introduced into the Muda region, Malaysia's rice-bowl area, increased class differentiation: as a minority of commercial farmers emerged from a growing class of small holders, the landless were cut adrift from the tenure system and cast upon the urban economy (Scott 1985: pp. 70–7). In Kuala Langat, an expanded state bureaucracy and population pressure on the land also increased class differentiation: well-to-do peasants and civil servants, who had contacts with state and UMNO party officials, benefited more than others did from farm subsidies and loan speculation. In my survey of 242 households, a quarter were landless or owned only their house lot. Sixty-one percent had access to farms under two and a half acres, a size just adequate for supporting a family of four. About sixty-five percent of the household heads (mainly men) were working as day laborers or migrant workers, reflecting a movement out of cash cropping into the wage

economy. With land fragmentation, rising land costs and an increasing reliance on wage employment, many village men found themselves unable to pass property on to their children so as to make a *kampung* livelihood. This increasing 'crisis of transmission' was first noted by Banks (1983) among Kedah rice peasants. In Sungai Jawa, only a few years later, many fathers did not have enough land left for their sons. In fact, they were beginning to depend on children's wages to augment the household budget.

Meanwhile, welfare policies seemed to prepare *kampung* children for different places in the wider economy. From independence to 1975, development expenditures in rural areas increased about sixfold (Scott 1985: p. 44). In Kuala Langat, a coeducational high school and a free trade zone were set up. The best students were creamed off through nationally certified examinations and sent to urban schools and colleges or to overseas universities on state scholarships. Like *kampung* youth throughout the country, those high school graduates left in Sungai Jawa rejected farming as a way of life. Many youths preferred to remain unemployed, waiting for a plum job as office boy in some government agency. With the NEP, the outmigration of young *kampung* men and, increasingly, women for higher education and wage work became an irreversible process, dramatically changing parent-child and gender relations.

Family Planning

As in many developing countries, family planning in Malaysia was informed by the postwar World Bank prescription of increasing agricultural development while reducing family size. For instance, in land development schemes Malay settlers were given maternity benefits for only the first three children. Concerned that family policy could be construed as interference in Malay husbands' rights, officials packaged family planning as a 'health programme', emphasizing nutrition and well-being while strategically pushing fertility control. Family planning ideology promoted a model based on the Western conjugal family, using the term *keluarga* (kindred) to designate a 'nuclear family' made up of a working father, housewife, and dependent children. A pamphlet promoting contraceptives depicted family problems caused by a tired and irritable wife burdened with housework and childcare. She was portrayed as inadequate to her husband's needs. Village women were urged to take the Pill in order to spare their husbands 'inconvenience'. But in suggesting that the Pill could improve husband-wife relations, the program was an unwelcome intrusion into an area governed by Islamic law and personal desires.

Not surprisingly, village men actively resisted family planning, using the health services of the 'maternity and children's' clinic in Sungai Jawa to attain the highest birthrate in the district. There is little doubt that throughout the country, in fact, 'family planning' programs contributed to rising birthrates among Malay villagers: during the 1970s and 1980s, fertility rates rose among Malays but fell among the Chinese and Indians (Hirschman 1986). In Sungai Jawa, a survey of 238 ever-married women (from 242 households) showed that they had given birth to an average of five to six children, a higher rate than in previous decades.

Nevertheless, the ideology of family planning increased tensions between husbands and wives. In Sungai Jawa and, I suspect, most villages, the Pill was the main contraceptive provided by government clinics. Villagers noted that women taking the Pill complained of headaches, a 'bloated' appearance and a lethargy that made them 'too lazy to work'. Some husbands even threatened that if their wives got sick from the Pill, they would be refused help. Male hostility to family planning was so strong that men rejected contraceptives even when they were poor and could barely support large families. A twenty-seven-year-old mother of six children under fifteen was seven months' pregnant when I met her; she had wanted to go on the Pill after the fourth child but her husband, a laborer, had refused her permission. She said that most women had children because their husbands wished it, even though women themselves did not desire many children (although they did feel some concern about having children for old-age security). In another case, after a

woman had had her sixteenth child – delivered by Caesarean – the nurse had suggested family planning. The woman had refused, saying 'Allah giveth'. Her father and her husband were both devout Muslims.

Family planning challenged *kampung* men's exclusive rights to their wives' sexuality. In addition, the men feared that contraceptives might embolden women to dissent from their husbands' wishes.[9] Villagers and religious leaders often used Islam, citing the hadith (an authorized compilation of the Prophet's words, deeds and exemplary practices) to criticize family planning as 'killing the fetus'. In the villagers' daily conversations the distinctions between miscarriage, abortion and contraception were often blurred. An *imam* told me that the Qur'an allowed abortion when the mother's health was endangered or the family could not possibly support another child, but, as the above examples illustrate, husbands rejected contraception even in such cases.

Since family planning was considered anti-Islam, those who used contraceptives had reason to conceal their decision. The Sungai Jawa clinic kept records on ninety-seven family planning couples, showing that seventy percent of the husbands were wage workers. Most of the wives were between fourteen and twenty-eight years old. I was told that perhaps twenty or more young couples bought their own contraceptives rather than get them free at the clinic. The factory women I interviewed said they did not intend to have more than four children. Young couples who depended mainly or exclusively on wage income had begun to talk about children in terms of 'costs'. Besides creating more expenses, children required help with their schoolwork so that they could later compete for white-collar jobs. Wage employment and family planning together, thus, produced an adjustment in family relations challenging two key elements of masculinity – a man's control of his wife's sexuality, and his ability to raise children.

Whatever the local effects of the family planning program, most Malays viewed the family planning ideology as ultimately a threat to their national survival. Although teachers and other state servants might have been practising contraception in private, in public they loudly proclaimed the practice contrary to Islam. A teacher said that he rejected family planning for Malays because it implied that they were incapable of raising as many children as they desired. He hinted that, as *bumiputera*, Malays were promised government preference in scholarships, jobs, business licenses and credit. Moreover, family planning conflicted in practice with state policies encouraging Malays to have many children as one way of increasing wealth and ensuring the success of the race. Civil servants warned that if contraception were widely adopted, Malays would lose their voting power vis-à-vis the other races. Modern concepts and practices concerning health and sex thus challenged male conjugal rights, their moral authority over women, and Islam. And not only did family planning challenge Islamic culture, but it threatened Malay racial power as well. The recruitment of young women into the labor force offered a further challenge to local norms for regulating female sexuality and social reproduction.

The Deployment of Female Labour in Free Trade Zones

As welfare policy tried to mange the bodily care and reproduction of peasant Malays, social engineering redistributed the younger generations in new locations scattered throughout the wider society. The *Third Malaysia Plan* notes that the general aim of the NEP was to promote the 'progressive transformation of the country's racially-compartmentalized economic system into one in which the composition of Malaysian society is visibly reflected in its countryside and towns, farms and factories, shops and offices.'[10]

Throughout the 1970s, state intervention in the peasant sector generated a steady influx of Malays into cities, a rising number of them young women. Tens of thousands of female migrants collected in urban free trade zones, working in labor-intensive subsidiaries of transnational corporations (Jamilah 1980). These corporations had established electronics

firms, garment factories, and other light manufacturing plants in the special zones, where they were legally required to have a thirty percent *bumiputera* representation in their work force. By the late 1970s, some 80,000 *kampung* girls between the ages of sixteen and the mid-twenties had been transformed into industrial laborers (Jamilah 1980). The industrialization strategy, originally focused on creating a male Malay working class, found itself producing an increasingly female industrial force, largely because of the manufacturing demand for cheaper (female) labor.

This army of working daughters introduced another line of division into the Malay household. In Sungai Jawa, the local free trade zone turned village girls into factory operators. Many peasants eagerly sent their daughters off to earn an income to be put towards household expenses. Most working daughters were induced to hand over part of their paychecks, especially when brothers proved reluctant to share their own earnings, were unemployed or were attending school. Daughters' wages paid for consumer durables and house renovations that broadcast the new wealth of *kampung* families (Ackerman 1984: p. 53). Not unexpectedly, working daughters strengthened the influence of mothers in the household: since it would be shameful for fathers to ask help from daughters, mothers extracted the earnings. Village men found themselves unable to fulfill their duties as fathers and husbands. Some felt humiliated that they depended on daughters' wages and could not keep them at home, their virtue protected (Ackerman 1984: p. *56;* Ong 1987: p. 99).

Nationwide, as thousands of peasant girls descended on cities and free trade zones, they came into competition with their male peers. For young men, sisters became an easily tapped source of cash, but as would-be wives working women transgressed the wider arena of male power. So long as unmarried girls were confined to the *kampung* milieu, men's superiority in experience and knowledge could remain unchallenged. Now, young women too were acquiring experience in market situations, situations where they could mingle freely with men. Furthermore, the new class of female workers and college students induced in their male peers a widespread fear of female competition in the changing society.

For the first time in Malay history, a large number of nubile women had the money and social freedom to experiment with a newly awakened sense of self. Many came to define themselves, through work experiences and market choices, as not materially or even morally dependent on parents and kinsmen. Factory women could now save for their weddings, instead of receiving money from their parents, and could therefore choose their own husbands. The increasing number of brides who were wage earners produced a trend toward larger wedding outlays by grooms for feasting and for outfitting the bride and the new household. In Sungai Jawa, many men did not hesitate to emphasize their prestige by spending lavishly. Civil servants had access to government loans for just such expenses. Between 1976 and 1980, wedding payments exceeding M$1,000 (approximately US$500) increased from fifteen to fifty-three percent.[11] These sums were presented in fresh bank notes expertly folded into money trees, a ritual symbolizing masculine power, now subsidized not by fathers but by the government. In the changing *kampung* society, young men and women found themselves dependent on the labor market and the state, rather than on their parents, as they negotiated the path toward adulthood. Young women, however, came to bear special moral burdens for realizing the image of a modern Malay society.

Work Ethics, Women's Duties, and the Modern Family

In the early 1980s, the state introduced a 'Look East' policy to enforce discipline in modern institutions. Some observers saw bureaucrats as the focus of this campaign (Mauzy and Milne 1983), but in my view, the object of this discourse has been workers, especially Malay female workers in transnational firms, many Japanese-owned (see also Kua 1983). The prime minister lauded Japanese companies for their 'family system', which displayed concern 'for the welfare of their employees', and he remarked on the similarity between Japanese and Malaysian 'morals and ethics' (Das 1982: pp. 38–9). The aim of the policy, an educator explained, was 'to urge Muslims to follow the attitude and work ethics of a

successful race [the Japanese] as long as it does not contravene Islamic ideals and principles'.[12] The presumed 'communal spirit' of Japanese enterprises was presented as in keeping with Islamic kinship values.

Whereas health policy pushed a nuclear family ideal, industrial ideology promoted a patrilineal 'family welfare' model said to reflect the *keluarga* emphasis on mutual obligations and loyalty. In the Kuala Langat free trade zone, a company motto proclaimed its goal to be:

> to create one big family,
>
> to train workers,
>
> to increase loyalty to company, country and fellow workers.

Despite this corporate 'philosophy', many factory women felt manipulated and harassed by male supervisors whom they were urged to consider as family elders. To some workers, management was implacably the other ('aliens'): it did not speak their language, was not Muslim, profited from their labor, and sometimes treated them as though they were not 'human beings'. Among operators, only fellow workers were considered 'siblings' (*saudara saudari*). Despite factory-induced competition among operators, workers in the same section would help each other and look out for new recruits, as one would for one's *keluarga*. Such mutual dependence, of course, unintentionally reinforced self-regulation, commitment, and discipline among workers – the goals of the 'one big family' ideology.

The 'poverty eradication' program also promoted new concepts of female duty, based on the Western notion of family as a privatized unit of obligations and exclusion (cf. Asad 1987). In the Fifth Malaysia Plan, women were seen as key to improving the lot of 'low-income households'. Rural women were blamed for not being hardworking and for their presumed lack of response to 'modern practices' and 'new opportunities' for improving the well-being of their families. Officials dictated a series of tasks women could undertake to improve the health and wealth of their families. Peasant mothers were instructed to ignore 'customary' practices in preparing their children for 'a progressive society'; they were called upon to raise children with values such as 'efficiency' and 'self-reliance'.[13] A government program called KEMAS ('tidy up') instructed village women in home economics and handicrafts. The new housewife requirements echoed the slogan 'Clean, Efficient and Trustworthy', displayed in factories with largely female work forces. The official discourse on the modern family thus defined women's modern roles: as working daughters who could pull their families out of 'backwardness' and as housewives (*serirumah*) who could inculcate 'progressive' values in their children. This privileging of the mother-child relationship reflected the Western family model while ignoring the central role of the Muslim father.

Through various NEP programs, then, the ideology of a modern Malay society unintentionally undermined the source of customary male power. Welfare policies progressively defined a privatized domestic sphere and women's responsibilities in it. This family model seemed to undermine male conjugal and paternity rights while supporting a more assertive role for women at home. Second, the emphasis on *bumiputera* rights greatly raised the expectations of young people without eliminating their sense of uncertainty in the multiethnic society to which they were channeled as students, wage workers, professionals, and unemployed youths. Their cultural dislocation was compounded by the changing sexual division of labor and the new freedoms of daughters, wives, female students and female workers. Moral confusion over the proper roles of men and women and the boundaries between the public and domestic, Muslim and non-Muslim worlds contributed to a crisis of national identity.

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM: ENGENDERING THE *UMMA*

In Malaysia, Islamic resurgent movements are not historically unprecedented: during the struggle for national independence, Islamic reformists challenged traditional Malay systems (Roff 1967), and in post-independence Malaysia, the major opposition party, PAS (*Partai Islam Se Malaysia*), used Islam to articulate the discontent of poor peasants in the east coast states (Kessler 1978). In the 1970s, diverse Islamic revivalist groups, collectively referred to as the *dakwa* (proselytizing) movement, began to develop among the *kampung*-born and educated Malays who had emerged as a new social force under the NEP.[14]

Here, I will focus on the major group, ABIM (*Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia* or Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia), which rose to national prominence through the 1970s, at its height numbering some 30,000 members and innumerable sympathizers. Besides its size, it drew on the largest cohort of young Malays to have benefited from mass literacy. They differed from earlier generations of revivalists in that they emphasized a direct engagement with holy texts (the sunnah, hadith and Qur'an), bypassing the received wisdom of traditional religious leaders (*ulama*). ABIM members and supporters were mainly young men and women who, hailing from villages like Sungai Jawa, had migrated into cities for wage employment and higher education. Despite the *bumiputera* rhetoric, they had been made aware of the gulf between them and the older Malay elites who had come to power under British tutelage. Students sent on scholarships to universities in London, Cairo and Islamabad were exposed to the various strands of Islamic resurgence abroad. Upon returning home, many became *dakwa* leaders who railed against the decadent lifestyle of nouveauxriches Malays, with their pursuit of glittering acquisitions and sensual pleasures and their blithe disregard of Islam (Chandra 1986: pp. 70–1). ABIM's leader, Anwar Ibrahim, proclaimed that Islam opposed 'development which propagates inequality and which is void of moral and spiritual values' (Anwar 1986: p. 5). Embedded in this critique was a class analysis linking upper-class corruption to the impoverishment of the Malay majority (Kessler 1980). Moreover, the *dakwa* perception that non-Malay communities were more successful in the secular milieu produced fears for Malay survival. Looking back, an ABIM leader said: 'After "May 13" [1969; that is, the racial riots] … [i]t was all a question of the survival of the *umma*, of the Malay race. Previously, we [thought] about all these problems outside Islam, when actually we could have solved them through Islam' (Zainah 1987: p. 11).

ABIM's search for an Islamic revivalist identity was an assault on a hegemonic construction of *bumiputera-hood* that did not address the cultural problems of Malays living in a secular, multiethnic world. As the above quotation suggests, the recovery of the *umma* (social and religious community) became a central goal in dealing with the breakdown in social boundaries that had traditionally defined Malay group identity. Through *dakwa* activities, ABIM members aimed to awaken a 'broader religious consciousness' among Muslims (Nagata 1984: pp. 81–2). *Dakwa* attacks on capitalism focused on its spawning choices and practices 'based not on divine morality but on sensuality and as such not according to truth and justice' (Mohammad 1981: p. 1046). The 'truth' that Islamic revivalists sought was to be found in an *umma* that would infuse the community as well as the government with revitalized Islamic values (Hassan 1987).[15] By insisting on a stricter adherence to the *umma*, the *dakwa* was urging a social system more gender-stratified than existed in Malay society.

Writing about Islamic revivalism in Morocco, Mernissi noted that the *umma*, which recognized Allah as its only leader, resisted the secular power of the modern state when it spread to previously uncontested areas of domestic relations (1987: pp. 20–2). The *umma* was 'ultimately a society of male citizens who possessed … the female half of the population' (Mernissi 1987: p. 169). For Malay revivalists, the *umma* had been unmade by the influx of women into modern schools and offices; a new 'sacred architecture' of sexuality (Mernissi 1987: p. xvi) had to be created, through everyday practices inventing 'Islamic' traditions (Hobsbawm 1983) that would redraw boundaries between Malay men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims. Almost overnight, large numbers of university students, young workers and

even professionals began to enact – in prayer, diet, clothing and social life – religious practices borrowed from Islamic history, Middle Eastern societies and South Asian cults. Here, I will present two cases which show that attacks on changing gender and domestic relations were central to the *dakwa* construction of the *umma*.

In Sungai Jawa, villagers felt a general anxiety about the ways in which state policies and secularization had weakened male authority over young women. Parents were torn between wanting their daughters to work and being concerned about keeping their status honorable. With independent earnings, women's agency, formerly channeled through legal superiors (parents, husbands), came to express individual interests in consumption and in dating. Factory women took to wearing revealing Western outfits (such as jeans and miniskirts) and bright makeup. This 'sarong-to-jeans movement' was seen as a license for permissiveness that overturned *kampung* norms of maidenly decorum. In the factories, nubile women were daily supervised by men, many non-Malays, an arrangement that seemed to mock at Malay male authority. Worse, some working women began to date non-Malay men, breaking village norms of sexual and religious segregation. It is not a matter of romance, but of social relationships,' one worker commented. Women who were unrestrained (*bebas*) by family guidance in relations with men were derided as being no longer Malay (*bukan Melayu*). Villagers viewed this development of an autonomous female agency as a weakening of male control and of the boundaries between Malays and non-Malaya (see also Peletz 1993).

The religious response to women's assertiveness was exemplified in a speech given at a village celebration of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday in 1979. A young scholar complained that the modern ills afflicting Malays included drug taking, excessive watching of television and communism (he mentioned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). Islamic societies were weak not because Islam was weak, but because Muslims were weak human beings who succumbed to their baser nature (*nafsu*). He elaborated this theme by saying that women's roles as mothers and wives had to be strengthened according to Islamic tenets. When a student at Al-Azhar, Cairo, he had had the opportunity to observe the great respect children showed their mothers in societies where Islam was an overwhelming force in everyday life. He urged villagers to raise their children with great respect for authority. And, while all Muslims should obey Islamic laws and respect their elders, women should first and foremost serve their husbands. He then raised the vision of factory women 'letting themselves' be cheated by men, thus 'damaging themselves'. Wage work was presented as dishonorable, inducing women to indulge their indiscriminate passions. He continued by saying that a woman's sensual nature was acceptable only if (his hands sculpting the air to suggest a curvaceous body) her sexual allure were reserved for her husband's pleasure. He ended by calling on village women to emulate the Prophet's wife, Katijah.[16] This call for a strengthening of the Malay race required women to adhere to a stricter Islamic version of male authority and of women's roles as mothers and wives.

The use of foreign Islamic practices to validate increased male authority over women was also evident in the middle-class milieu. In the mid-1980s, a Malay socialist named Kassim Ahmad stirred up a hornet's nest by publishing a modest critique of the hadith, the text used in the everyday teachings of *dakwa* members. Exposing various 'contradictions' between the hadith and the Qur'an, Kassim Ahmad argued that the latter was the only source of truth for Muslims. For instance, contrary to the Qur'an, the hadith was 'anti-women'. It prescribed 'stoning to death' for adulterers (Kassim 1986: pp. 95–6, 101–2) and even claimed that fasting women should submit themselves to their husbands' carnal desires (Kassim 1986: pp. 104–5). This challenge galvanized orthodox *ulama* and Islamic revivals alike into calling for a ban on Kassim Ahmad's book and censuring him in other ways. Although the controversy was mainly phrased in terms of Kassim Ahmad's religious expertise, its very silence over the 'contradictions' specified by Kassim Ahmad revealed the

depth of popular sentiment about husbands' control of their wives.[17] Public discussions of the case failed to refer to local Malay traditions that do not condone the punitive measures mentioned in the hadith. This controversy in fact provided an opportunity for Islamic revivalists to insist anew that Muslim men should have total authority over women.

In thus defining a new *umma*, ABIM and other *dakwa* groups were inventing practices harking back to a mythic, homogeneous past, while rejecting their Malay-Muslim cultural heritage. This Arabization of Malay society depended in large part on implementing a rigid separation between male public roles and female domestic ones, a concrete realization of the architecture of male rationality (*akal*) and female eroticism (*nafsu*) that went way beyond any arrangement found in indigenous village arrangements where *akal* and *nafsu* are found in both women and men (see Peletz, this volume). A new radical division between Malay men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims, was thus being constructed in public life, primarily by inscribing a religious spatialization of power on women's bodies.

WOMEN'S AGENCY AND THE BODY POLITIC

Draped in dark veils and robes, women are the most potent symbols of Islamic revivalism. Their presence calls into question feminist assumptions that women in Muslim societies would invariably 'resist' lslamic resurgent movements (see, for example, Kabeer 1988). In Malaysia, women displayed a range of responses, both to modernization and to Islamic revivalism, that cannot be reduced to 'resistance', a term implying only oppositional tactics. Here, I suggest that, among Malay women, agency in terms of autonomy or adherence to interests not independently conceived differed according to class. Whereas working-class women were less morally compromised by working, middle-class women were significantly swayed by the spirit of Islamic resurgence in their understanding of femininity.

It would be erroneous to assume that state policies unambiguously provided Malay women with conditions for employment and individual security. Land scarcity, widespread female wage labor and secularization in many cases reduced men's customary obligation to be the sole supporters of their families where possible. Furthermore, the trend toward female wage employment made all Malay women vulnerable to a reduction or even withdrawal of their husbands' support. At an UMNO Women's meeting, wives of the rural elite complained that government promotion of the 'housewife' did not guarantee women economic support. Leaders reminded village women of their responsibilities for the educational success of their children and the preservation of the UMNO heritage for their grandchildren. However, some women noted that men viewed their wives as having rights only in housework and childcare, with no claim on their husbands' salaries. Invoking the Islamic marriage contract, members proposed that mutual respect and intimacy within marriage would be improved if the state could guarantee that 'housewives' would be paid an 'allowance' drawn from their husbands' salaries. This proposal indicated that even women not caught up in Islamic revivalism felt that social and economic changes made them vulnerable to loss of the male protection provided by Islamic law. Although their demands for payment for housework may seem an echo of Western feminist demands, they were really calling on the government to enforce men's customary role as sole supporters of their families. It is such protests by middle-class women that have resulted in new Islamic family laws for the 'protection of women's rights' regarding divorce. For the first time, Islamic judges nationwide have been ordered to regulate their implementation of family laws.[18] For Malays who consider divorce and polygamy male rights, this law must seem to be yet another instance of state inroads on the power vested in men by Islam.

For unmarried women, the impact of modernizing forces has been greater and more disorienting, especially among the first large generation of Malay university women. Many have found refuge in the *dakwa* movement. On the University of Malaya campus, at least sixty percent of the students showed some commitment to *dakwa* in the early 1980s (Zainah,

1987: p. 33). Whereas ABIM men wore Western shirts and pants, dakwa women put on the *mini-telekung*, a cloth that tightly frames the face and covers the head, hair and chest, considered parts of the *aurat* ('nakedness') that Islam requires women to conceal. This headcloth was usually worn with the customary *baju kurung*. Some women also donned long black robes (*hijab*), socks, gloves and face-veils, denoting a full purdah (*parda*) historically alien to Malay culture.[19] This representation of the female body may be seen as 'subversive *bricolages'* (Comaroff 1985: pp. 197–8) combining elements of different traditions to register protest over cultural dislocations linked to colonial and postcolonial domination.

Students walking around in full purdah were a source of irritation to government officials worried that 'Arabic' robes would scare off foreign investors. In fact, *dakwa* groups were critical of the kind of cultural colonializing promoted by the market, media, and foreign corporations. A female *dakwa* lecturer assailed working women for adopting the consumerist 'feminine false consciousness' promoted by factory culture (Amriah 1989). As a male revivalist remarked, 'I feel that secularism is the biggest threat to the Muslim *umma*' (Zainah 1987: p. 76). *Dakwa* groups sought to provide networks and daily support for Malay women disoriented by the consumerism of modern life.

ABIM recruitment of women was not only a resistance to capitalist culture, but also a reorienting of women's agency to rebuild a Malay-Muslim identity. State policies had 'liberated' women for campuses and the marketplace, but could not offer protection against new self-doubts and social anxieties among women and men. Released from the guidance and protection of their kin, many young women were compelled to act as 'individuals' representing their own interests in the wider society. Furthermore, Malay society for the first time confronted the problem of a large group of unmarried young women, whose unregulated sexuality was seen as symbolic of social disorder (cf. Mernissi 1987: p. xxiv). Fatna Sabbah argues that Muslim women's entry into the modern economy is often seen as a challenge to men's economic role, the basis of their virility; men thus perceive women's participation in modern public life as a form of 'erotic aggression' (Sabbah 1984: p. 17). This reading is highly suggestive for the Malaysian case. The *dakwa* obsession with women's 'modesty' in 'male' and multiethnic spaces was reflected in their insistence that women cover themselves. Women's bodily containment was key to the envisaged order that would contain those social forces unleashed by state policies and the capitalist economy. The *mini-telekung* and long robes marked off the female body as an enclosed, 'pregnant' space, symbolic of the boundaries drawn around Malay society and the male authority within it.

Such dramatic reversals from their brief exposure to personal liberation were more evident among female university students than among blue-collar women. Campuses were the seats of the most intensive *dakwa* campaigns to cover the female body and maintain sexual and ethnic segregation. Women were discouraged from participating in sports that exposed their naked limbs (Nagata 1984: p. 100). A University of Malaya ban on the *mini-telekung* in lecture halls failed to deter many female students from covering their heads. Even female lecturers who rejected the *dakwa* prescription felt sufficiently intimidated to wear headscarves and avoid Western style clothing.

The following two examples illustrate the centrality of sexuality to female students' struggles between autonomy and group identity. One student, who favored leotards and disco dancing, was repeatedly chastised by *dakwa* members over a period of two years. One day her boyfriend urged her to don the *mini-telekung* because, he said, it would help him resist her sexual appeal. When she finally complied, *dakwa* women immediately embraced and salaamed to her (Zainah 1987: pp. 64–7). In another case, a student confided that when she first came to the university she had worn 'miniskirts and low-cut clothes'. She had mixed with Chinese students and attended campus 'cultural' events, but not religious ones. One day she received a letter, signed 'servant of Allah', accusing her of having sinned by befriending Chinese infidels, who would lead her astray. Just for not covering her head, she would burn in hell (Zainah 1987: p. 60). As these cases indicate, ABIM recruits were often women who had tasted individual 'freedom' but, subjected to pressure and even

outright threats, later found security and acceptance in Islamic revivalism. By donning *dakwa* outfits, they could negotiate the urban milieu without being insulted by men. The *dakwa* robes registered the multiple effects of cultural disorientation, protest, and intimidation, enfolding them in a moral community. Furthermore, through their *dakwa* outfits, women proclaimed the impossibility of interethnic liaisons or marriages, thereby stemming any potential loss in progeny to the Malay race, who form a small majority in Malaysia.[20] *Dakwa* women have thus asserted Malay singularity against Malaysian multiculturalism, at the same time partaking of the aura cast by the global Islamic efflorescence.

Depeasantization, Middle-Class Women, and Religious Nationalism

The Islamic resurgence and all its trappings quickly became associated with upwardly mobile *kampung* and urban middle-class women, rather than peasant or working-class women. In Sungai Jawa, where most young women were employed in factories, only a handful who managed to enter teachers' colleges and the university wore *dakwa* outfits. Village elders noted that the religious clothing, while admirable, was inappropriate for life in the village. An elder woman explained that her granddaughter, clothed in *mini-telekung* and *hijab*, was dressed in the way of 'an educated woman'. In contrast, because she herself was a peasant (*tani*), she could sit comfortably in her carelessly tied blouse and sarong.[21] Hardly any factory woman adopted the *dakwa* robes, although many believed that the intensified religious environment provided them protection against sexual and social abuse in the wider society (Ong 1987: pp. 181–93). Thus, *dakwa* clothing became a symbol of depeasantization,[22] a process of class mobility whereby successful Malay women explored their gender identity in modern Islamic terms.

For many Malay women, depeasantization and higher education were not to be associated with exploring their sexual selves; rather, a higher social and moral status required rigid constraints on sexual expression. Thus many university-educated women were caught between the demands of individualistic competition in higher education and the job market, on the one hand, and their hopes of being married on the other. Indeed, the *dakwa* granddaughter mentioned above, who was in her early twenties, spent her holidays in the village reading British romances, ostensibly to improve her English. Her mother complained anxiously about her lack of suitors, blaming it on her ignorance of the finer aspects of cooking, cleaning and childcare, the important skills of village wives.

Such tensions are reflected in a university survey of a hundred and fifty female seniors who revealed ambivalence about their new status, stating that they did not believe in competing with men in the labor market. They would only seek jobs which involved serving others – for example, as clerks, teachers, nurses or doctors (attending to women and children only). The respondents considered occupations that would put them in authority positions over men forbidden by Islam, because to work in such positions would change the status of women visa-vis men (Narli 1981: pp. 131–3; see also Nagata 1984: pp. 74–5). A deep concern among educated women was their postponement of marriage and their fear of being progressively priced out of the marriage market by their academic credentials. By seeking to maintain, rather than challenge, male authority, they would be better assured of finding husbands. They are the ones most likely to don *dakwa* robes that soon became the Malay woman's working uniform, replacing the body-fitting *batik sarung-kebaya* of the days before the Islamic resurgence.

The discourse on Muslim womanhood thus became a countermodel to the government's promotion of working women, the modern family, and the secular 'housewife' ideal. These were all seen as threats to male authority at home and in the public sphere. ABIM members insisted that women's first duties were to their husbands and that wives should obey their husbands just as all Muslims should obey Allah. The moral of wives' obedience seemed to be an appropriate

ideology for the urban middle class, among whom divorce has lately declined, possibly because of women's fear of the economic and social losses it would entail, but also because of middle-class men's ability to fulfill the economic and moral implications of the husband/father role (Peletz, this volume). Among working-class women, divorce rates remained high (Azizah 1987: pp. 109–10; Ong 1990: pp. 453–4). The nurturing and self-sacrificing role of women as homebound mothers emphasized in resurgent teachings was more easily realized by middle-class women who did not need to make a living. ABIM members frequently invoked the Qur'anic phrase 'paradise lies beneath [our] mothers' feet' (Nagata 1984: p. 100), to celebrate women's primary responsibility for instilling Islamic values in their children. Women were also urged to spread Islamic values among their female friends. In *dakwa* discourse, the redirection of women's agency from labor force to moral force tapped into the deepseated spiritual unease of women aspiring to be upwardly mobile, yet filled with ambivalence about careers and the solitude of modern life.

Thus, although a substantial number of its members were engaged in a genuine spiritual quest, the *dakwa* movement also reflected a discontent with changing gender roles and the declining force of male authority in the new middle-class family. This analysis helps to explain the apparently paradoxical fact that many young women who had benefited from state policies (which opened up educational and employment opportunities to them in the first place) found the *dakwa* call so appealing. In *dakwa* visions, women are all married and fulfilled. As wives and mothers, they play central roles in rebuilding and preserving Malay society as part of the larger Islamic family (Anwar 1986: p. 5). The Islamic resurgence reminds them of their moral duty to construct and nurture a modern Muslim-Malay community imagined by *dakwa* leaders. In the university survey, most of the women interviewed considered themselves to be 'first and foremost Muslims', arguing that 'nowadays, there is only one tradition – that is, Islamic tradition'. They saw Islam as a 'more comprehensive value system' than Malay customs, one more fit to guide them in this era of rapid change. Some insisted on being reidentified, saying 'I am Muslim rather than Malay' (Narli 1981: pp. 132–3). The *dakwa* movement thus constructs a kind of religious nationalism, divested of many attractive features of indigenous Malay culture, that is based on an invented tradition, and the creation of a strict Muslim patriarchal domination in both public and domestic spheres.

OFFICIAL ISLAM'S NEW WOMEN

The powerful Islamic claim on a Malay moral identity and criticisms of modernization caused the state to launch an Islamization campaign of its own in the early 1980s. Its most important move was to co-opt the charismatic ABIM leader Anwar Ibrahim into the government, putting him in charge of youth and sports. In addition, the state set up official Islamic institutions for banking, university education and missionary programs. More rigorous efforts were made to punish Muslims who broke religious laws forbidding gambling, drinking and sex out of wedlock (Mauzy and Milne 1983). On television, Islamic programs proliferated, some promoting the image of 'ideal mothers' who would put their husbands and children before anything else.

The new religious tone of state programs prepared the stage for a new 'family development' policy. A new language linking development, population and the family articulated the new moral role of Malay women. The government proclaimed a goal of population growth from fourteen to seventy million over the next hundred years in order to meet the anticipated labor needs for sustained capitalist development.[23] Although there was widespread skepticism about the possibility of attaining this goal, the new population policy found support even among Malays disaffected with the UMNO regime. The uncharacteristic silence over racial composition led many to believe that population growth would be encouraged only among Malays. The program seemed to allow natural population growth among Malays to be augmented by the largescale immigration of Indonesians who could easily be absorbed into the *bumiputera* category

(Clad 1984: pp. 109–10). Second, in producing a discourse on 'family development' (thus overturning family planning), the state appropriated the *dakwa* themes of defining and empowering Malays in opposition to non-Malays. Despite its technocratic language, the policy explicitly links the success of the Malay family to the strengthening of the body politic. Third, the 'pronatalist' (Stivens 1987) thrust of the message diffused Malay fears of female domination in the labor force while accommodating the *dakwa* insistence on women' s primary role as mothers. The prime minister was quoted as saying that women whose husbands could afford it should stay home to raise families of at least five children (Chee 1988: p. 166). Undoubtedly, through such official approval and flattery of middle-class men (who can afford to support non-working wives), the state regained control over the definition of the domestic domain, earning moral and even Islamic legitimacy in the process. The family development campaign suggested that middle-class women should rethink their options since the pregnant body at home can be even more patriotic than the female body at work. Furthermore, male-dominated Malay families are not incompatible with a growing population and capitalist economy.

Thus, despite differences over the issue of economic development, both resurgent Islam and the secular state have made the image of an Islamic modernity, with its powerful claims on women and their bodies, the key element in their competing visions of Malaysian society. The consequence of such ideological competition between official and religious nationalisms has been the intensification of Malay gender difference, segregation and inequality. The intersection of hegemonic and counterhegemonic visions was occasioned in large part by an obsession with racial, political and demographic domination on the one hand, and by an emergent, conservative middle class's need to maintain patriarchal control of the family, on the other.

SOFT NATIONALISM AND SISTERS IN ISLAM

By the end of the 1980s, the Islamic resurgence had settled in as a low-key but pervasive part of urban Malay culture. Malay women continued to be conservatively dressed in long robes and *mini-telekung*, but their clothes were now cut in colorful, more glamorous styles. Few chose to drape them selves entirely in black. Growing economic affluence among Malays and increasing economic interdependence with other Asian countries had somewhat routinized the fervor of resurgent Islam and instilled a detachment from Middle East events like the Rushdie affair and the Gulf War. While the Islamic resurgence took more militaristic forms in the Middle East, in Malaysia both official and religious nationalisms became low-key integrated into the fabric of a rapidly modernizing society in which the domination of the Malays is now well-assured. As inconsistencies between the *dakwa* political body and the physical body of desire and affluence grew, women's outfits reflected an interesting nexus of religious and fashion consciousness.[24] It is not so much that eroticism is breaking through the *dakwa* body, but rather that the body is being remanaged with a lighter hand.

Talking about another invented tradition in Malaysia, Clive S. Kessler (1992) notes the new expressions of loyalty through popular songs and media images celebrating the subject-leader relationship in Malay culture. On television, women again play important iconic roles, but this time decked out in colorful, stereotypical costumes representing the different ethnic groups, they take turns singing a new patriotic song (*Lagu Setia*). Kessler observes that the song projects patriotism and loyalty as 'a kind of falling in love, a voluptuous yearning, a chaste seduction'. Loyalty, Kessler argues, is 'reimagined and reinvented … as something modern, subtle, low-key' (1992: p. 155). In sharp contrast to the forbidding *dakwa* image, this new multiracial female body is seductive, even yielding, tentatively open to outside influences. Such a repackaged 'soft'nationalism, whereby politics, religion, culture and entertainment are interwoven and inseparable, allows the racial body and, by extension, the wider imagined community of Malaysia to engender a limited kind of multiculturalism.[25]

As the Muslim-non-Muslim boundaries became less rigid, the state redirected its ideological energy toward the larger Asian arena. Increasingly the state faced off challenges not so much from an Islamic resurgence as from elements in the middle class agitating for the rights of women, political detainees and restive workers. The prime minister became internationally known for his outspoken criticism of the West and defended his occasional curtailment of civil rights by proclaiming a culturally relative notion of 'human rights' in Asian modernity. Anwar Ibrahim, former ABIM leader and the new deputy prime minister, had long set aside his ascetic, firebrand image for expensive batik silks. Perhaps anticipating being the ruler of a rich multiracial country, he speaks cordially of multicultural tolerance among the different races. This muting of racial and religious differences in public discourse also owes something to the fact that Taiwanese Chinese have become the most numerous foreign investors in the country, while the Malaysian government is competing for investments in China. Similarly, the low-key Islamic resurgence has been adjusted to local realities. The *hijab* has even become something of a patriotic fashion that is sometimes adopted by non-Muslim women to proclaim a generalized loyalty and vision of a multicultural Malaysia.

The merging and muting of state and religious nationalisms have created openings for a renegotiation of gender relations. The moral economy of resurgent Islam gave women little choice but to inscribe themselves into a 'traditional' subordination, even when that position was itself an invented tradition.[26] Because Malay community, kinship and gender matters are informed by Islamic law, women who may resist their second-class status cannot draw upon civil laws to articulate women's rights. However, the *umma* has nurtured a group of Malay female professionals to invent other Islamic traditions heretofore ignored by male leaders. Calling themselves 'Sisters in Islam', they seek to articulate women's rights within Islam by emphasizing the need to interpret the Qur'an and hadith in their proper historical and cultural contexts. They point out that narrowly literal interpretations of Islamic texts like the right to strike one's wife and polygamy may work against the rights of Muslim women in modern times. Through a careful citing of Islam's holy books, the Sisters identify the universal principle that the sexes are equal, 'members, one of another'.[27] They argue that the Qur'an suggested 'a single strike' against the wife to restore marital peace (verse 4:34) but that this was at a time when violence against women was rampant. Furthermore, they contest the view that polygamy is Islam's answer to 'men's allegedly unbridled lust'. Instead, they call upon men who abuse polygamy to seek Islamic guidance to change their promiscuous attitude to 'one of self-discipline and respect for the opposite sex'. Thus, contrary to hegemonic Islamic discourses that oppose male reason to female passion, the Sisters chide men for their lustfulness and lack of discipline: 'It is not Islam that oppresses women, but human beings with all their weaknesses who have failed to understand Allah's intentions.'[28]

Furthermore, by acting as reasoning Sisters in Islam, they present themselves as siblings arguing on equal terms with men and appealing to their much-vaunted male reason in reinterpreting Allah's will regarding women's status. They also criticize other forms of patriarchal practices said to be required by Islam, like the imposed female dress codes and even speech restrictions, as 'mechanisms of control' masquerading as norms promoting feminine modesty. However, the Sisters' strategy unintentionally strengthens the reason-as-to-male versus passion-as-to-female ideology since only by being reasoning sisters can they get respectful male attention concerning the subordination of daughters, wives and mothers (i.e., kinship statuses in which women's passions are experienced as more threatening). Thus women's rights in Islam are being fought for by a group exuding the chaste aura of learned sisters; the division between reason and passion remains, but now men have to be more mindful of their unruly passions and women who work with their minds must be cast as sexually unthreatening.[29]

In contrast to the growing negotiations over middle-class Muslim women's rights, the resurgent Islamic party PAS, working among the rural poor, is agitating for greater controls over Muslims, especially over women. Recently, PAS introduced strict Islamic laws (*hudud*) in Kelantan state to punish offences like theft, robbery, apostasy and unlawful sexual intercourse by stoning, whipping and amputation. The laws are especially discriminatory against women since a rape victim must produce four male eyewitnesses in her defense. Thus just as the nation's Islamic elites have begun the tentative articulation of women's rights, peasant-based revivalists are seeking to impose a stricter kind of Islam, springing in part from an intensified sense of political marginalization and exclusion from the material benefits of capitalism. In Kuala Lumpur, where Malay middle-class religious fervor is tempered by affluence and cosmopolitanism, there is something surreal in the prime minister declaring that 'I don't think we are going to allow them to chop off heads, hands, and feet'.[30] The chaste voluptuous body of affluent Malay nationalism faces off the specter of a truncated one representing patriarchal Islam. Thus, the struggle between state nationalism and Islamic radicalism continues in another guise on other sites rooted in other class, political and regional dynamics, but still focused on regulating women, who symbolize the varied ways Islam may be deployed to loosen or control the body politic in an unevenly modernized country. Indeed, it appears that the newly 'reasonable' resurgent Islam and the newly affluent state are both seeking to regulate not just women's bodies but ultimately *all* bodies.[31]

CONCLUSIONS

In the postcolonial era, many Third World states have had to contend with communally based narratives expressing particular interests that have been overlooked in nationalist struggles against colonialism. In Southeast Asia, as postcolonial states sponsored changes that uprooted peasants, intervened in the conduct of family relations, and created new urban classes, they also produced nationalist ideologies that rationalize these transformations in technocratic (World Bank) terms. Among groups dislocated by these changes, crises in cultural identity created counter ideologies that are obsessively concerned with controlling resources, group boundaries and articulating belonging in transcendental terms. Women, as symbols and agents of change, have to be brought into line with the new orthodoxies. Other scholars have shown that historically, the emerging middle classes have turned to a religious resurgence to construct patriarchal family orders, and to patrol the boundaries between the domestic and public, insiders and outsiders. It bears remembering that all Great Religions – Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism – are heavily patriarchal, investing substantial weight in women's roles as wives and mothers. Whether the emerging middle classes turn to Christian fundamentalism (e.g., Ryan 1981) or Islamic resurgence in order to conserve their economic, political and cultural resources, they find in religion an important source of competing nationalist ideologies in modernizing societies.

The twists and turns in gender contestations show vividly that gender politics are seldom merely about gender; they represent and crystallize nationwide struggles over a crisis of cultural identity, development, class formation, and the changing kinds of imagined community that are envisioned. The management and self-managing that women's bodies come to represent is in tandem with the larger forces at work in the construction of the body politic. Religious conservatism, almost always symbolized by confining women's agency and space, may eventually give way to looser mechanisms for controlling women's bodily and social movements, and the boundaries of the imagined community. As the middle class gains more security and confidence, women play a greater role in reworking gender inequality and group boundaries within the religious orthodoxy. In places like late-twentieth-century Malaysia, local conditions and complex racial and cultural features have produced a particular form of rivalry between the ideological state and Islamic revivalists, and conditioned the responses of women who both symbolize and negotiate these contestations over women

and imagined communities. Rather than seeing the agency of middle-class Malay women in terms of mere resistance or passivity, I have argued that it has been shaped by the intersection of their own self-interests with their group identity, contingent upon the historical changes in Malay society and in Malaysia over the past two decades. By yielding to religious and class forces, and by working to protect the integrity of their bodies, families and the body politic, women have found new ways of belonging in a changing Malaysia.

NOTES

An earlier and shorter version of this chapter appeared as 'State versus Islam: Malay Families, Women's Bodies, and the Body Politic in Malaysia', *American Ethnologist*17(2): pp. 258–76, May 1990. I am particularly grateful to Michael Peletz for his thoughtful and helpful suggestions in this new version.

1. Furthermore, Scott's argument that Malaysian state hegemony stops at the village gates and that peasants' everyday resistances are informed by a Malay village subculture unadulterated by wider politics is problematic for two major reasons. It reveals his misreading of the Gramscian notion of hegemony as an ideological formation which dominates through the creation of false consciousness, and which does not allow for oppositional views (Scott 1985: pp. 316–18). Actually, Gramsci was very critical of the 'false consciousness' model, and developed hegemony as an alternative theory of rule by consent (not oppression or mystification), which is an always open-ended process (1971; see also Williams 1977). However, in Scott's view, when Malay peasants challenge hegemonic views of development, they can only do so from a position he artificially defines as outside the realm of state hegemony (Scott 1985: pp. 335–40). He seems to have missed the Gramscian notion of counterhegemony, and its dialectical relationship to hegemonic forms. Thus Scott came to misrepresent social realities in rural Malaysia as a simple dichotomy between a national hegemony and a resistant village subculture. In contrast, other scholars provide a more complex and entangled picture of Malay peasants in their daily lives deeply implicated in the religious, ethnic, and political economic hegemonies prevailing in the country (see Kessler 1978; Shamsul 1986; Ong 1987; Peletz 1995)

2. Federated Malay States Enactment no. 15, 1913.

3. 'Malay' in the Malaysian context denotes persons of a Malay-Muslim identity. They are Sunni Muslims at birth. The term 'Malay' will be used interchangeably with *bumiputera* (sons of the soil). Since the Malay language does not use suffixes to denote the plural condition, words like *kampung* and *bumiputera* will not be suffixed with an 's.'

4. This article deals only with the situation in West (Peninsular) Malaysia. In 1985, there were about 13 million citizens, with Malays making up some 56 per cent, Chinese 33 per cent and Indians 10 per cent of the population (Government of Malaysia 1986: pp. 128–9).

5. It is important to stress that the Malay *kampung* women I interviewed saw Islamic beliefs about sexuality in a positive light. For instance, *kampung* women claimed that female circumcision (partial removal of the clitoral hood) increased a woman's sexual pleasure during intercourse (cf. Reid 1988: p. 149). *Kampung* women use different techniques and tonics (*jamu*) to condition their bodies for enhancing erotic pleasure. Sex was considered essential to good health and a normal life and only viewed negatively when indulged in excessively or with an unsuitable partner, 10.

6. Similar attitudes towards female sexuality outside marriage are found in many Asian, Middle East and Mediterranean societies. See Goddard (1987) who argues that Neapolitan male control of female sexuality is linked to women's role as the bearers of group identity.

7. See Government of Malaysia (1976: pp. 2, 9), and Siddique (1981). In 1970, the Malay share of equity capital was 2.4 percent. The NEP sought to expand that figure by entitling *bumiputera* to equity held in trust by special government agencies. By 1990, *bumiputera* equity still fell short of 30 percent, but the new affluence has made it possible for the government to promote economic growth among the poor in all ethnic communities without holding back wealth accumulation by the bumiputera as a whole.

8. Government of Malaysia (1976: 86–9).

9. Formerly, Malay women could turn to midwives for covert treatment to prevent childbirth, but traditional midwifery is now officially frowned upon (Laderman 1983: pp. 104–105). The modern health system reduces women's role in birth prevention because men have become more directly involved in decision making affecting women's health.

10. Government of Malaysia (1976: p. 9).

11. In the 1960s, wedding payments were in the range of M$100 to M$500. The increase in payments between 1976 and 1980 also reflected a rise in mean age at first marriage – from late adolescence to twenty-two years for women and twenty-eight years for men.

12. *The New Straits Times*, November 8, 1983, p. 2.

13. Government of Malaysia (1986: pp. 83–4).

14. The term 'Islamic resurgence' is widely used to describe the activities and ideologies of both rural peasant and urban middle-class groups. I focus on the latter here because they were more numerous and had a wider effect on the upper echelons of Malay society. For different interpretations of the causes of the Islamic resurgence, see Lyon (1979), Nagata (1984), Chandra (1986), Kessler (1978, 1980), Mohammad (1981), Muhammad Kamal (1987) and Zainah (1987).

15. The *dakwa* leaders were challenging the legal dualism between religion and government inherited from British colonial rule (see Roff 1967). They wished to expand the scope of Islamic law (*hukum*) to cover areas currently governed by civil and criminal law.

16. He did not mention that Katijah (Ar., Khadija) was many years older than Muhammad and an enterprising business woman in her own right.

17. This rhetorical insistence on the husband's sexual needs ignores the *adat* expectation that husbands and wives will satisfy each other sexually. Good marriages seem to require lively sexual encounters, commonly referred to as 'sparring' (*melawan*). A man's inability to please his wife sexually may become the subject of gossip (Karim 1992).

18. *The New Straits Times*, July 14, 1988, p. 2.

19. See Reid (1988: pp. 85–90) for a brief historical account of Malay clothing from the fifteenth century onward. The coming of Islam induced otherwise bare-chested Malay women and men to wear loose tunics (*baju*) above their sarongs. However, heavily veiled women 'covered from head to foot' were observed only in Makassar (in present-day Indonesia) in the mid-seventeenth century.

20. A. C. Hepburn observes that, in societies dominated by a numerically small majority, the containment of intermarriage is crucial to the maintenance of the existing population structure (1978: p. 4).

21. This grandmother, lounging on her verandah in full view of passersby sometimes opened her blouse and allowed her three-year-old grandson to play with her breasts. She gave the impression that she pitied her granddaughter who was 'having such hard life' as a student and unmarried woman.

22. Soheir Morsy used the word 'depeasantization' to describe the Islamic resurgence in Egypt, where out-migration and education have created a new ideology of the discontented upwardly mobile (personal communication).

23. Government of Malaysia (1984: pp. 21–2). Demographic projections of the various ways the population can grow to 70 million in a hundred years have been worked out by Jones and Lim (1985) and by Chee (1988: p. 167), who argues that the population policy could legitimize using women as a population reserve.

24. Conflicts between the status body and the physical body are a key theme in Takie Lebra's (1994) highly suggestive essay on the imperial family and body politic in Japan.

25. Prasenjit Duara makes a distinction between an incipient nationality with soft boundaries that allow cultural practices to be shared and adopted between groups, and nationalism with hard boundaries, when selected cultural practices are used to mobilize and define the boundaries of a particular group (1993: p. 20). Here I am using 'soft nationalism' in a slightly different way, as one that allows some intermingling of culture at the borders of groups, and as a national identity that can coexist with nationalism identified with fixed boundaries. I also use 'soft nationalism' to denote the low-key, media-processed patriotism that has overtaken more strident forms like the Islamic resurgence.

26. It is important to note that this 're-traditionalization' (Williams n.d.) is a mythic invention. One should therefore be cautious of statements about the Malay middle class's reconstruction of Malay identity 'through the symbols of a traditional, village-based, feudalistic and patriarchal Malay culture' (Joel Kahn, cited in Kessler 1992: p. 146) when that 'culture' is described in such static and extreme terms. See Banks (1983), Ong (1987), and Peletz (1995) for more complex, ethno-graphically based descriptions of gender relations in different Malay village communities.

27. *Asiaweek*, August 9, 1991, p. 27; see also *Asiaweek*, November 17, 1993, p. 17.

28. Ibid.

29. See Peletz 1995, chapter 5, for an extended and careful discussion of how the reasompassion gender ideology is unevenly embraced by Malay women and men as practical knowledge. See also Peletz 1988 for a discussion of the striking importance of the sibling relationship in Malay society as a channel for familial aid, exchange and mediation, but also as a source of ambivalence and hostility.

30. *South Chinese Morning Post*, November 22, 1993, p. 14.

31. This includes the bodies of male transvestites called *pondan/Mak Nyah* (Peletz 1995, chap. 3). I thank Michael Peletz for pointing this out to me.

REFERENCES

Ackerman, Susan. 1984. 'The Impact of Industrialization on the Social Role of Rural Malay Women', in Hing Ai Yun, Nik Safiah Karim and Rokiah Talib, eds., *Women in Malaysia*, pp. 40–70. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications.

Amriah Buang. 1989. 'Development and Factory Women – Negative Perceptions from a Malaysian Source Area', paper presented at the Commonwealth Geographical Bureau Workshop on Gender and Development. University of Newcastle, April 16–21.

Anagnost, Ann. 1989. 'Prosperity and Counterprosperity: The Moral Discourse on Wealth in Post-Mao China', in Arif Dirlik and Maurice Miesner, eds., *Marxism and the Chinese Experience: Issues in Contemporary Chinese Socialism*, pp. 210–34. Armon, M. E. Sharpe.

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. 1992. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins of Nationalism*. 2d ed. London: Verso.

Anwar Ibrahim. 1986. 'Development, Values and Changing Political Ideas', *Sojourn* 1(1): pp. 1–7.

Asad, Talal 1987. 'Conscripts of Western Civilization', unpublished MS.

Azizah Kassim. 1987. 'Women and Divorce among the Urban Malays', in Hing Ai Yun, Nik Safiah Karim and Rokiah Talib, eds., *Women in Malaysia*, pp. 94–112. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications.

Banks, David. 1983. *Malay Kinship*. Philadelphia: ISHI Publications.

Chandra Muzaffar. 1986. 'Malaysia: Islamic Resurgence and the Question of Development', Sojourn 1(1): pp. 57–75.

Chatterjee, Partha. 1993. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chee Heng Leng. 1988. 'Babies to Order: Recent Population Policies in Malaysia and Singapore', in Bina Agarwal, ed., *Structures of Patriarchy: The State, the Community, and the Household*, pp. 164–74. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Clad, James. 1984. 'The Patchwork Society', *Far Eastern Economic Review* (April 20): 109–10.

Comaroff, Jean. 1985. *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Das, K. 1982. 'Mahathir's "Restoration"', *Far Eastern Economic Review* (June 11): pp. 38–9.

——. 1983. 'A Shift in the Balance', *Far Eastern Economic Review* (June 2): pp. 42–3.

Djamour, Judith. 1959. *Malay Kinship and Marriage in Singapore*. London: Athlone Press.

Donzelot, Jacques. 1979. *The Policing of Families*. New York: Random House.

Duara, Prasenjit. 1993. 'Deconstructing the Chinese Nation', *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 30: pp. 1–28.

Federated Malay States Enactment, no. 15.1913. Ms. *Arkib Negara Malaysia* (National Archives of Malaysia). Petaling Jay a, Malaysia.

Firth, Rosemary. 1966. *Housekeeping among Malay Peasants*. New York: Humanities Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1978. *The History of Sexuality*, trans Robert Hurley. Vol. 1, *An Introduction*. New York: Pantheon.

——. 1980. *Power/Knowledge*, trans. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon.

Goddard, Victoria. 1987. 'Honor and Shame: The Control of Women's Sexuality and Group Identity in Naples', in Pat Caplan, ed., *The Cultural Construction of Sexuality*, pp. 166–92. New York: Tavistock Publications.

'Government of Malaysia. 1976. *Third Malaysia Plan, 1976–1980*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printing Press.

——. 1984. *Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan*, 1981–1985. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printing Press.

——. 1986. *Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986–1990*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printing Press.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, ed. and trans. Quinten Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers.

Hassan, Muhammad Kamal. 1987. 'The Response of Muslim Youth Organizations to Political Change: HMI in Indonesia and ABIM in Malaysia', in William R. Roff, ed., *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning*, pp. 180–96. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hepburn, A. C. 1978. 'Minorities in History', in A. C. Hepburn, ed., *Minorities in History: Papers Read before the Thirtieth Irish Conference of Historians at the New University of Ulster, 1977*, pp. 1–10. London: Edward Arnold.

Hirschman, Charles. 1986. 'The Recent Rise in Malay Fertility: A New Trend or a Temporary Lull in a Fertility Transition?', *Demography* 23(2): pp. 161–84.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1983. 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions,' in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition*, pp. 1–14. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jamilah Ariffin. 1980. 'Industrial Development in Peninsular Malaysia and Rural-Urban Migration of Women Workers: Impact and Implications', *Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia* 1: pp. 41–59.

Jomo K. Sundaram. 1988. *A Question of Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven Development in Malaysia*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Jones, Gavin, and Lim Lin Lee. 1985. 'Scenarios for the Future Population Growth in Malaysia', *Kajian Malaysia* 3(2): pp. 1–24.

Kabeer, Naila. 1988. 'Subordination and Struggle: Women in Bangladesh', *New Left Review* 168: pp. 95–121.

Kahn, Joel S., and Francis K W. Loh, eds. 1993. *Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Karim Wazir Jahan. 1992. *Women and Culture: Between Malay Adat and Islam*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Kassim Ahmad. 1986. *Hadis: Satu Penilailan Semula* (*The Hadith: A Reinterpretation*). Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Media Intelek Sdn. Bhd.

Kessler, Clive S. 1978. *Islam and Politics in a Malay State. Kehutan 1838–1969*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

—— 1980. 'Malaysia: Islamic Revivalism and Political Disaffection in a Divided Society', *Southeast Asia Chronicle* 75: pp. 3–11.

——. 1992. 'Archaism and Modernity: Contemporary Malay Political Culture', in Joel S. Kahn and Francis K. W. Loh, eds., *Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia*, pp. 133–57. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Kua Kia Soong. 1983. 'Look East, But Watch for Blemishes.' *Far Eastern Economic Review* (March 31): pp. 69–70.

Laderman, Carol. 1983. *Wives and Midwives: Childbirth and Nutrition in Rural Malaysia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lebra, Takie. 1994. 'Status Dilemma and the Body Politic in Japan', paper presented at the Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley, January 28.

Lyon, Margo. 1979. 'The Dakwah Movement in Malaysia'. *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 13(2): pp. 34–45.

Mauzy, Diane K. and R. S. Milne. 1983. 'The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline through Islam', *Pacific Affairs* 55: 617–48.

Mernissi, Fatima. 1987. *Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society*. Rev. ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Milner, A. C. 1982. *Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule*. Tuscon. University of Arizona Press.

Mohammad Abu Bakar. 1981. 'Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia', *Asian Survey* 21: pp. 1040–59.

Nagata, Judith. 1984. *The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Narli, Ayse Nilufer. 1981. 'Development, Malay Women, and Islam in Malaysia: Emerging Contradictions', *Kajian Malaysia* 2: pp. 123–41.

Ong, Aihwa. 1987. *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia*. Albany: SUNY Press.

——. 1990. 'Japanese Factories, Malay Workers: Class and Sexual Metaphors in West Malaysia' in Jane M. Atkinson and Shelly Errington, eds., *Power and Difference: Gender in Island Southeast Asia*, pp. 385–422, 453–7. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

——. 'Postcolonial Nationalism: Women and Retraditionalization in the Islamic Imaginary, Malaysia', in Connie Sutton, ed.. *Feminism, Nationalism, and Militarism*. Arlington: American Anthropological Association.

Peletz, Michael G. 1988. *A Share of the Harvest: Kinship, Property, and Social History among the Malays of Rembau*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

——. 1993. 'Sacred Texts and Dangerous Words: The Politics of Law and Cultural Rationalization in Malaysia'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35(1): pp. 66–109.

——. 1995. *Reason and Passion: Representations of Gender in a Malay Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Reid, Anthony. 1988. *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680*. Vol. I, *The Lands Below the Winds*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Roff, William R. 1967. *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ryan, Mary. 1981. *The Cradle of the Middle Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sabbah, Fatna A. 1984. *Women in the Muslim Unconscious*. New York: Pergamon Press.

Salaff, Janet W. 1988. *State and Family in Singapore: Restructuring a Developing Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Scott, James C. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Shamsul Amri Baharuddin. 1986. *From British to Bumiputera Rule: Local Politics and Rural Development in Peninsular Malaysia*. Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies.

Siddique, Sharon. 1981. 'Some Aspects of Malay-Muslim Ethnicity in Peninsular Malaysia', Contemporary Southeast Asia 3(1): pp. 76–87.

Stivens, Maila. 1987. 'Family and State in Malaysian Industrialization: The Case of Rembau, Negri Sembilan, Malaysia', in Haleh Afshar, ed., Women, State and Ideology, pp. 89–110. Albany: SUNYPress.

Strathern, Marilyn. 1987. 'Introduction', in Marilyn Strathern, ed., *Dealing with Inequality: Analysing Gender Relations in Melanesia and Beyond*, pp. 1–32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Swift, Michael. 1963. 'Men and Women in Malay Society', in Barbara Ward, ed., *Women in the New Asia: The Changing Social Roles of Men and Women in South and Southeast Asia*, pp. 268–86. Paris: UNESCO

Williams, Brackette F, ed. n.d. *Mannish Women: Retraditionalized Female Gender and the Nationality of Domesticity*. New York: Routledge. Forthcoming.

Williams, Raymond. 1977. *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press Wong, Diana. 1988. *Peasants in the Making: Malaysia's Green Revolution*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

Zainah Anwar. 1987. *Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia*. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications.

From: Aihwa Ong (1995), 'State Versus Islam: Malay Families, Women's Bodies and the Body Politic in Malaysia', pp. 160–94, in Aihwa Ong and Michael G. Peletz (eds), *Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender and Body Politics in Southeast Asia* (California: The University of California Press).